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Functioning as adverbials, yídìng and shìbì in 
Mandarin Chinese can either express intensi-
fication or (strong) epistemic necessity. In ad-
dition, context influences their semantics. 
Hence, dynamic semantics are proposed for 
them. An information state  is a pair <A, s>, 
where s is a proposition and A is an affirma-
tive ordering. Yídìng() performs update on an 
information state: A is updated with  and s is 
specified to be a subset of or equal of , as 
long as  is true in one of the absolutely af-
firmative worlds. Otherwise, uttering yídìng() 
leads to an absurd state. This is how a strong 
epistemic necessity reading is derived. To 
yield an intensification reading, yídìng() per-
forms a test on the information state. Yídìng() 
gives back the original information state as 
long as  is true in all of the absolutely af-
firmative worlds. Otherwise, an absurd state is 
produced. As for shìbì, its semantics is identi-
cal to that of yídìng, except for that the s in an 
information state  for shìbì is underspecified 
and needs resolving before a proposition gets 
an appropriate interpretation. The information 
needed to resolve the underspecified s for 
shìbì must be inferred from the context. 
1 Introduction 
In Mandarin Chinese (henceforth, Chinese), inten-
sification and modal necessity can be expressed by 
the same lexical item. Adverbial yídìng is one of 
such lexical items.
1
 Please refer to the following 
examples. 
 
(1) A: Zhāngsān  xǐhuān  Xiǎoměi  ma? 
           Zhangsan  like       Xiaomei  Q
2
 
    ‘Does Zhangsan like Xiaomei?’ 
      B: Zhāngsān  yídìng  xǐhuān  Xiǎoměi 
    Zhangsan  YÍDÌNG  like       Xiaomei 
Tā  hěn  zhùyì                    Xiǎoměi-de   
    He  very pay.attention.to  Xiaomei-ASSO 
    yìjǔyídòng. Zhè  shì  hěn  hélìde  
    move         this  be   very reasonable 
    tuīcè. 
    conjecture 
    ‘It must be the case that Zhangsan likes 
            Xiaomei. He pays much attention to 
 every move of Xiaomei. This is a rea-
sonable conjecture.’ 
      B’: Zhāngsān  yídìng  xǐhuān  Xiǎoměi. 
 Zhangsan  YÍDÌNG  like       Xiaomei 
 Zhè  shì  zhòngsuǒzhōzhīde shìshí. 
 This be   widely-known        fact 
 ‘Zhangsan definitely likes Xiaomei. This 
is a widely-known fact.’  
 
                                                          
1 Please note that yídìng can function either as a nominal mod-
ifier or a propositional modifier. The former is referred to as 
adjectival yídìng and the latter adverbial yídìng. This paper 
discusses adverbial yídìng only because the semantics of ad-
jectival yídìng is simple and not as rich as adverbial yídìng. 
2 The abbreviations used in this paper include: ASSO for an 
associative marker, DEON for a deontic modal expression, DYN 
for a dynamic modal expression, EPI for an epistemic modal 
expression, Prc for a sentence-final particle, Prg for a progres-
sive marker, Q for an interrogative particle. 
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(1) contains two conversations: one between A 
and B, and the other between A and B’. In the two 
conversations, A asks whether Zhangsan likes 
Xiaomei. Although the same sentence Zhāngsān 
yídìng xǐhuān Xiǎoměi ‘Zhangsan YÍDÌNG like 
Xiaomei’ is uttered as a response to A’s question, 
yídìng has different semantic functions. In the ut-
terance of B, yídìng expresses epistemic necessity 
because B says that the proposition Zhāngsān 
yídìng xǐhuān Xiǎoměi ‘Zhangsan YÍDÌNG like 
Xiaomei’ is a reasonable conjecture. Yídìng of this 
usage is translated as it must be the case that… 
Moreover, when expressing epistemic necessity, 
yídìng expresses ‘strong’ epistemic necessity. The 
following examples demonstrate the difference 
between epistemic necessity and ‘strong’ epistemic 
necessity. 
 
(2) a. Ruóguǒ  zài     kǎo           bù   jígé,  nǐ  
   If           again take.exam not pass   you 
         māma yídìng hěn  shēngqì. 
  Mom   YÍDÌNG very angry 
 ‘If you fail the exam again, it must be the 
case that you mom will be very angry.’ 
     b. Ruóguǒ  zài     kǎo           bù   jígé,  nǐ  
  If           again take.exam not pass   you 
 māma huì  hěn  shēngqì. 
 Mom  will very angry 
 ‘If you fail the exam again, you mom will 
be very angry.’ 
 
The difference between (2a) and (2b) lies in 
that (2a) contains yídìng, while (2b) uses huì. Huì 
has several meanings and one of them is inference, 
e.g. Chang (2000), Liu (1997), etc. In (2b), huì is 
used express an inference about a future situation 
based the antecedent led by rúguǒ ‘if’. Although 
yídìng in (2a) has a similar function, (2a) and (2b) 
have a subtle semantic difference: (2a) shows a 
stronger certainty of the speaker’s regarding the 
truth of the proposition your Mom will be angry, 
compared to (2b). Hence, when used to indicate an 
inference, yídìng is said to express ‘strong’ epis-
temic necessity. 
On the other hand, yídìng in the utterance of B’ 
has a different semantic function. In this utterance, 
yídìng is used to intensify the speaker’s affirma-
tiveness toward the proposition your Mom will be 
angry, instead of expressing the proposition as an 
inference. The intensification function of yídìng in 
this example is made explicit because of B’ claims 
that the proposition (=Zhāngsān yídìng xǐhuān 
Xiǎoměi ‘Zhangsan YÍDÌNG like Xiaomei’) is a 
widely-known fact. This usage of yídìng is trans-
lated as definitely in English and is referred to as 
an intensification reading. 
Shìbì has a semantic function similar to yídìng 
and they are interchangeable in some examples, 
but not in others. See below. 
 
(3) a. Yīnwèi  zhùzi tài   xì,  yòng  zhè  zhǒng 
   Because pillar too thin, use   this  kind 
   wūdǐng  yídìng/shìbì   yǒu kěnéng  
   roof       YÍDÌNG/SHÌBÌ have possibility  
tāxiàlái. 
collapse 
‘Because the pillars are too thin, if this 
type of roof is used, it is definitely possi-
ble that the roof will collapse.’ 
b. Rúgǒu  nǐ  chuān  hòu    yīfú,      nǐde 
    if          you wear   thick  clothes your 
    shāng  yídìng/shìbì    jiào          qīng. 
 wound YÍDÌNG/SHÌBÌ relatively minor 
 ‘If you wear thick clothes, it must be the 
case that your wound is relative minor.’ 
(4) a. Zhè-ge  shíhòu, Xiǎomíng   yídìng/*shìbì 
   This-CL time     Xiaoming YÍDÌNG/*SHÌBÌ 
     zài   jiā. 
 at   home 
 ‘At this moment, it must be the case that 
Xiaoming is at home.’ 
b. Hūn      hòu,  rúgǔo   zhù   Yìnní,     wǒ 
    married after  if         live Indonesia  I 
   *yídìng/shìbì    cídiào  gōngzuò. 
 *YÍDÌNG/SHÌBÌ  resign  job 
    ‘After getting married, if we live in Indo-
nesia, I definitely have to quit my job.’ 
 
In (3a, b), yídìng and shìbì are interchangeable 
and these two sentences are pretty much synony-
mous. However, in (4a, b), they are not inter-
changeable. In (4a), only yídìng is allowed, 
whereas in (4b) only shìbì is permissible. 
In this paper, I would like to address the follow-
ing questions. First, is it possible to provide a uni-
fied semantics for yídìng and shìbì? Second, how 
can the unified semantics account for the semantic 
similarity and difference between yídìng and shìbì 
as demonstrated in (3) and (4)? Finally, how can 
the unified semantics take care of contextual influ-
ence on the semantics of yídìng and shìbì illustrat-
ed by the utterances of B and of B’ in (1)? 
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section 
Two, I critically review literature on yídìng and 
shìbì. In Section Three, I present more data and 
provide dynamic semantics for yídìng and shìbì. 
Section Four concludes this paper. 
2 Review of Previous Studies 
The literature on yídìng and/or shìbì include Chen 
(2011), Ding (2008a, b), C. Li (2005), S. Li (2009), 
Wang (2007), Xu (1995), Zhou (2014), etc. Xu 
(1995) is on the English translations of yídìng and 
two other adverbs and is not reviewed here. I criti-
cally review the other seven studies. 
I start with the literature on yídìng and conduct 
the review in chronological order. Li (2005) distin-
guishes two variants of yídìng, labeled as yídìng1 
and yídìng2. He suggests that the former expresses 
strong volition, either the subject’s or the speaker’s 
strong volition (for another person) to do some-
thing, while the latter denotes stipulation or judg-
ment. He further claims that yídìng1 often goes 
with yào, which expresses a deontic reading here, 
or with děi, which also has a deontic reading, and 
that yídìng2 often goes with shi ‘be’ or hui, which 
denotes epistemic necessity. 
A major problem with Li (2005) is that he 
does not take the intensification reading into con-
sideration, such as the utterance of B’ in (1). An-
other problem is that the semantic contribution of 
yídìng is blurred when it goes with another modal 
expression. For example, he suggests that yídìng 
děi ‘YÍDÌNG DEON’ expresses a deontic reading. 
Then, a reasonable question to ask is what seman-
tic contribution yídìng has here. The same problem 
occurs to yídìng huì ‘YÍDÌNG EPI’. 
Ding (2008a, b) also discusses the semantics 
of yídìng. These two studies distinguish yídìng1 
from yídìng2 as well. Similar to Li (2005), Ding 
(2008a, b) claims that yídìng1 expresses strong vo-
lition and yídìng2 denotes emphasis on the truth of 
an inference/judgment. Ding’s (2008a, b) conclu-
sion is similar to Li (2005) and hence suffers from 
the same problems.  
Chen (2011) is mostly on the grammaticali-
zation of yídìng. As for the semantics of yídìng, he 
claims that yídìng expresses strong volition or stip-
ulation/inference. Since Chen’s (2011) conclusion 
is identical to Li (2005) and Ding (2008a, b), and 
therefore is vulnerable to the same problems. 
Two major problems shared by Chen (2011), 
Ding (2008a, b) and Li (2005) are the following. 
First, they do not discuss whether it is possible to 
provide a unified semantics for yídìng, and second, 
they do not discuss how the contextual influence 
on the semantics of yídìng as demonstrated in the 
two conversations in (1) should be dealt with. 
S. Li (2009), Wang (2007) and Zhou (2014) 
focus on shìbì. These three studies are also re-
viewed in chronological order. Wang (2007) is on 
the lexicalization of shìbì. This paper suggests that 
shìbì describes an inference made based on a cur-
rent situation. S. Li (2009) is about the historical 
development of shìbì. This study states that shìbì 
expresses an inference that some situation is cer-
tain to take place in the future, based on the current 
status of some other situation. Zhou (2014) pro-
vides a relatively detailed discussion on the seman-
tic features of shìbì, but basically says the same 
thing as S. Li (2009) and Wang (2007). While ep-
istemic necessity is one of the readings expressed 
by shìbì, these studies cannot explain why shìbì is 
not good in (4a), which also has an epistemic ne-
cessity reading, and neither do they take the inten-
sification reading, such as (3a), into consideration. 
Since the above reviewed papers do not provide 
a comprehensive picture for the semantics of 
yídìng and shìbì, further study is called for so that 
the unanswered questions can be addressed. 
3 Semantics of Yídìng and Shìbì 
3.1 The Data 
Yídìng can either present a proposition without a 
modal expression or one with a modal expression. 
The utterances of B and of B’ in (1), and the sen-
tence (2a) are typical examples where yídìng pre-
sents a proposition not containing a modal 
expression. (3a) is an example where yídìng pre-
sents a modal containing a modal expression. Ei-
ther case, yídìng is ambiguous between a strong 
epistemic reading and an intensification reading. 
Let’s look at a few more examples. 
 
(5) a. Lǐsì  yídìng  zài  jiā. 
  Lisi  YÍDÌNG  at  home 
  ‘It must be the case that Lisi is at home.’ 
Or, ‘Lisi is definite at home.’ 




b.  Wángwǔ  yídìng  yǐjīng   xiěwán 
  Wangwu YÍDÌNG  already write.finish  
  gōngkè         le. 
  homework   Prc 
  ‘It must be the case that Wangwu has al-
ready finished his homework.’ Or, 
  ‘Wangwau definitely has finished his 
homework.’ 
c. Zài     xià  jǐ           tiān  dà         yǔ,    
 Again rain several day  heavy rain  
 zhèlǐ  yídìng fānshēng  tǔshīliú. 
 here  YÍDÌNG happen mud.slide 
 ‘If it rains heavily a few more days, it 
must be the case that mud slide will hap-
pen here.’ Or, 
  ‘If it rains heavily a few more days, mud 
slide definitely will happen here.’ 
(6) a. Zhàoliù  yídìng   huì    qí    jiǎotàchē. 
  Zhaoliu  YÍDÌNG  DYN ride  bike 
  ‘It must be the case that Zhaoliu can ride 
a bike.’ Or, 
  ‘Zhaoliu definitely can ride a bike.’ 
b. Sūnqī  yídìng  děi     dǎsǎo  fángjiān  le. 
  Sunqi YÍDÌNG DEON clean  room      Prc 
  ‘It must be the case that Sunqi has to 
clean his room.’ Or, 
  ‘Sunqi definitely has to clean his room.’ 
 
Some native speakers I consult point out to me 
that, standing alone, (6b) preferably has an intensi-
fication reading, rather than a strong epistemic ne-
cessity reading. However, if we provide a context 
for the sentence, the strong epistemic necessity 
reading can be brought out. For example, 
 
(7) Sūnqī  yídìng  děi      dǎsǎo  fángjiān  le. 
Sunqi  YÍDÌNG DEON clean   room      Prc 
Zhè  shì  wǒ-de  tuīcè.        Tā-de  fùmǔ 
this  be   my      conjecture his       parents 
yǐjīng    shòubǔliǎo   le. 
already  tolerate.not  Prc 
‘It must be the case that Sunqi has to clean 
his room. This is my guess. His parents 
cannot tolerate it anymore.’ 
 
So, can a unified semantics be proposed for 
yídìng? I believe so. The examples presented in 
this section and previous sections tell us that the 
semantics of yídìng contains two parts. The first 
part provides an epistemic necessity reading, just 
like must in English. The other part provides an 
intensification reading. 
If we put aside the contextual influence on the 
semantics of yídìng for the moment, the semantics 
of yídìng can be modeled using Kratzer’s 
(2012[1981], 1991) semantics of modal expres-
sions. See (8). 
 
(8) Modal semantics for yídìng 
 Modal base: Epistemic 
 Modal force: Necessity 
 Ordering sources: (a) doxastic or stereo- 
 typical, (b) affirmative 
 
In (8), the modal base, modal force and one 
of the ordering sources in (a) together are actually 
the typical semantics for an epistemic necessary 
modal expression. The new idea here is the second 
ordering source, the affirmative ordering source. 
von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) propose that weak 
necessity modals such as should in English need 
two ordering sources for their semantics. The idea 
of two ordering sources is adopted here.  
What is an affirmative ordering source? An af-
firmative ordering source orders possible worlds in 
terms of the speaker’s affirmativeness toward a 
proposition. A represents an affirmative ordering 
source. Then, the ordering of two possible worlds 
based on an affirmative ordering source is defined 
as below. 
 
(9) v, w are possible worlds. p is a proposition. 
 w A v iff {p: p is affirmed in v}  {p: p is 
  affirmed in w}  
             (cf. Kratzer 2012[1981]: 39) 
 
How about shìbì? I show that yídìng and shìbì 
are interchangeable in some cases, but not in others. 
For the purpose of discussion, I repeat the relevant 
examples in (10). 
 
(10) a. Zhè-ge  shíhòu, Xiǎomíng   yídìng/ 
     This-CL time     Xiaoming  YÍDÌNG/ 
      *shìbì   zài   jiā. 
   *SHÌBÌ  at   home 
 ‘At this moment, it must be the case 






b. Hūn      hòu,  rúgǔo   zhù   Yìnní,     wǒ 
        married after  if         live Indonesia  I 
       *yídìng/shìbì    cídiào  gōngzuò. 
   *YÍDÌNG/SHÌBÌ  resign  job 
     ‘After getting married, if we live in In-
donesia, I definitely have to quit my 
job.’ 
(11) a. Rúguǒ  wǒ  bù  néng  chōngfèn 
     If           I    not  can   sufficient 
       gōngyìng  shìchāng   dehuà, wǒ-de  
     provide     market      Prc      my  
     gùkè         shìbì/yídìng   huì   cóng    
     customer  SHÌBÌ/YÍDÌNG  will  from 
     bié     chù    gòu         huò.  
     other  place purchase goods 
      ‘If I cannot provide sufficiently in the 
market, my customers definitely pur-
chase goods from somewhere else.’ 
b. Yào    jiàngdī    chéngběn,    zhōngyóu 
 want  decrease  cost             CPC 
 yídìng/shìbì    yào      zēng    
 YÍDÌNG/SHÌBÌ  DEON  increase  
 chǎn 
 production 
 ‘If it wants to decrease cost, CPC defi-
nitely has to increase production.’ 
 
In (10a), yídìng is good, but shìbì is not. 331 
examples of shìbì are retrieved from the online 
version of the Sinica Corpus. Examining these ex-
amples carefully, I find that, whenever shìbì is 
used, additional information must be present so 
that the sentence with shìbì can be inferred. For 
example, in (10b), moving to Indonesia after get-
ting married leads to the event that the speaker has 
to quit his/her current job. The same reasoning ap-
plies to (11a, b). 
Therefore, the first difference between yídìng 
and shìbì is that the former does not need the con-
text to explicitly provide information based on 
which the proposition presented by yídìng can be 
inferred, whereas the latter does. In (10a), shìbì is 
not good because of lack of such information. 
What happens if another modal expression, oth-
er than yídìng and shìbì, occurs in the sentences, 
such as (11a, b)? In these cases, yídìng and shìbì 
are interchangeable, and they are ambiguous as 
discussed above. 
So, what is the semantics of shìbì and how is it 
related to that of yídìng? (10) sheds some light on 
this question. Again, putting contextual influence 
aside, I propose that the modal base of shìbì and 
the ordering source related to the modal base are 
both underspecified, while the affirmative ordering 
source is always there for shìbì. Shìbì cannot be 
used in (10a) because information required to infer 
the proposition presented by shìbì does not exist. 
The lack of such information makes it impossible 
to resolve the underspecified modal base (and the 
underspecified ordering source) of shìbì. 
On the other hand, in (10b), if one moves out of 
town, then it is most likely required for him/her to 
quit his/her current job in town. That is, the rela-
tion between the two clauses in (10b) indicates a 
deontic reading and the underspecified modal base 
of shìbì is resolved to circumstantial and the order-
ing source is related to a physical law: if one is not 
at a place, he cannot hold a job at that place.
3
 
In sum, putting contextual influence aside, I 
propose the following. Yídìng has an epistemic 
modal base and two ordering sources. One is dox-
astic or stereotypical and the other is affirmative. 
An affirmative ordering source orders possible 
worlds in terms of the degree of speaker’s affirma-
tiveness concerning a proposition. Shìbì has an 
underspecified modal base and two ordering 
sources. One of the ordering sources is underspeci-
fied as well because it needs to be compatible with 
the modal base. The other is an affirmative one. 
3.2 Dynamic Semantics for Yídìng and Shìbì 
Although, in Section 3.1, semantics are proposed, 
along the lines of Kratzer (2012[1981], 1991), for 
yídìng and shìbì, Kratzer’s semantics of modality 
cannot take care of contextual influence, which is 
demonstrated in the two conversations in (1). 
There is no mechanism in Kratzer’s semantics of 
modality (and in truth-conditional semantics as 
well) to deal with contextual effects. 
Instead, I would like to propose dynamic se-
mantics (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991, Chierchia 
1995, etc.)
4
 for yídìng and shìbì so that contextual 
effects can be taken care of. Yalcin (2007) discuss-
es why sentences such as suppose that it is raining 
but it might not be is infelicitous. In order to take 
care of embedded epistemic modals, a clause em-
bedded under suppose must be interpreted accord-
                                                          
3 Let’s not consider, for the moment, work at home through 
internet or other special situations.  
4  For an excellent introduction to dynamic (modal) logic, 
please refer to Sectioin 3.2, Portner (2008). 
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ing to what the subject supposes. Hence, one ver-
sion of Yalcin’s (2007) proposal is as follows: 
 
(12) a. Sw, xis defined as {w’: w’ is compatible 
with what x supposes in w} 
 b. ||x suppose ||c, s, w = {w: S w
x
   
     ||||c,Sw, x, w’} 
 c. ||Suppose that it is raining but it might 
not be|| = w’Sw,x:||||
c, Sw, x, w’ is true 
w’Sw, x: ||||
c, Sw, x, w’ is true 
 
(12c) is a contradiction because it is not plausi-
ble that Sw, x contains a possible world where  and 
 are both true at the same time. Yalcin’s (2007) 
idea applies to yídìng and shìbì as well because of 
the infelicity of the following example: 
 
(13) tiān  zhème hēi, xiànzài  yídìng/shìbì 
 sky  so       dark  now      YÍDÌNG/SHÌBÌ 
 zài xiàyù. #dànshì,  yě   yǒu   kěnéng 
 Prg rain    #but        also have possibility 
 méiyǒu 
 not 
 ‘It is so dark. Now, it must be the case that 
it is raining, #but it may not be.’ 
  
But, Yalcin’s (2007) idea alone is not adequate 
for yídìng and shìbì because they denote a ‘strong’ 
epistemic necessity reading, rather than simple ep-
istemic necessity. Is it possible to incorporate the 
affirmative ordering source as defined in Section 
3.1 into an information state, i.e. what Yalcin 
(2007) refers to as s? Veltman’s (1996) proposal 
can help us here. 
In order to account for the semantics of nor-
mally and presumably, Veltman (1996) propose 
that an information state is a pair  = <, s>. s is a 
proposition and Yalcin’s (2007) s or Sw, x is one 
type of Veltman’s (1996) s.  is an expectation pat-
tern, i.e. an ordering of possible worlds, where w 
 v iff every expectation which is met by v is also 
met by w (Veltman 1996: 13). 
Combining Veltman (1996) and Yalcin 
(2007), I propose that for yídìng and shìbì the in-
formation state  is also a pair and that  = <A, s>. 
s is a proposition, as in Veltman (1996) and Yalcin 
(2007). A is an affirmative ordering, where w  A v 
if and only if every proposition which is affirmed 
to be true in v is also affirmed to be true in w. 
In addition, in order to account for the high 
degree of affirmativness in the semantics of yídìng 
and shìbì, we define absolutely affirmative words 
as (14a). We also need to update the affirmative 
ordering with a proposition, so that the proposition 
is true in the worlds where more propositions are 
affirmed to be true, as defined in (14b): 
 
(14) a. Absolutely affirmative worlds (cf. n<, s> 
in Veltman 1996: 14) 
  AffA = {wW: vW, w  A v}, where 
W is the set of all possible worlds. 
 b. Updating an affirmative ordering 
   A = {<w, v>: w  A v if v, then 
w} 
 
(14a) says the following: AffA is a set of possi-
ble worlds each of whose members has more prop-
ositions affirmed to be true than one of the other 
possible worlds in W. AffA is referred to as the ab-
solutely affirmative worlds because all the worlds 
in this set contain only propositions affirmed to be 
true. 
(14b) is the definition of updating A with : 
A is a pair <w, v>, where, if  is true in v, then  
is also true in w, that is, the affirmative ordering 
takes  into consideration. In this way, we can re-
late a proposition  to an affirmative ordering A. 
 
(15) a. strong epistemic necessity reading 
   ||yídìng()||M 
  = <A, s> if AffA  {w:||||w, M = 
1}  and s represents the speaker’s 
knowledge in w; or 
  = absurd state, otherwise 
 b. intensification reading 
   ||yídìng()||M 
  =  if AffA  {w: ||||w,M=1}=AffA and s 
 the speaker’s knowledge in w; or 
  = absurd state, otherwise. 
 
(15a) accounts for the strong epistemic necessi-
ty reading yídìng can denote. The ordering source 
A is updated with the proposition . This update 
relates  to the order A so that the affirmative or-
dering takes  into consideration. Just like Yalcin 
(2007), s says that  is interpreted with respect 
to s, the speaker’s knowledge. There is a condition 
for the new information state <A, s> to hold: 
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 must be true in one of the absolutely affirmative 
worlds. This condition is stated as AffA  {w:   
||||w, M = 1} . If the condition does not hold, 
then A fails and uttering the ||yídìng()||M pro-
duces an absurd state. 
As for the intensification reading, since this is 
not an inference or judgment, s does not equal to 
the speaker’s knowledge in w. Instead of updating 
the information state, an intensification reading 
simply performs a test, as stated in (15b). As long 
as  is true in all of the absolutely affirmative 
worlds, then ||yídìng()||M gives back the original 
information state. If the condition does not hold, 
then an absurd state is yielded. 
How about shìbì? As pointed out in Section 3.1, 
the difference between yídìng and shìbì lies in that 
the modal base of shìbì is underspecified. If we 
examine the information state  carefully, we can 
find that s in  functions in a way similar to a 
modal base. Hence, I propose that the s in the in-
formation state for shíbí is underspecified and must 
be resolved before a sentence containing shìbì can 
get an appropriate interpretation. I formalize the 
idea as follows: 
 
(16) a. <A, s=?> ||shìbì()||M 
b. Suppose that ,  forms a (mini) dis-
course. ,  are propositions 
 If <A, s=?>, ||shìbì()||M and R(, ), 
then s = R. 
 
In (16a), s = ? stands for an underspecified s. In 
(16b), R(, ) means that  and  have a certain 
relation R. This R resolves the underspecified s. 
For example, in (10b), the two clauses are related 
because of a physical law, which says that one 
needs to live in a reasonable distance from where 
his job is. For this example, this physical law re-
solves s and hence (10b) can get an appropriate 
interpretation. Except for (16a, b), the semantics of 
shìbì is identical to that of yídìng, as in (15). 
Now, with the dynamic semantics (15) and (16), 
we can successfully explain the two conversations 
in (1). For the conversation between A and B, 
since B says that this is a reasonable conjecture, s 
must represent the speaker’s knowledge. Therefore, 
(15b) is ruled out. The information state is updated 
and we a strong epistemic necessity reading. 
On the other hand, for the conversation between 
A and B’, since B’ says that this is a widely-known 
fact, s cannot be equal to the speaker’s knowledge. 
Hence, (15b) kicks in and we get an intensification 
reading. 
In this section, I propose dynamic semantics for 
yídìng and shìbì. Both of these adverbials have an 
information state <A, s>, where s is a proposition 
and A is an affirmative ordering. To derive a 
strong epistemic necessity reading, yídìng and 
shìbì update A with a proposition they present and 
specify that the proposition is a subset of or equal 
to s. This update holds if  is true in one of the ab-
solutely affirmative worlds. To produce an intensi-
fication reading, a check is performed on an 
information state: if  is true in all of the absolute-
ly affirmative worlds, the original information state 
is returned. If the condition is not satisfied, neither 
strong epistemic necessity reading nor intensifica-
tion reading can be produced. This is the unified 
semantics for yídìng and shìbì. 
Their difference is that the s in an information 
state <A, s> for shìbì is underspecified, and needs 
to be contextually resolved so that a proposition 
presented by shìbì can get a proper reading. 
4     Conclusion 
In this paper, I propose dynamic semantics for 
yídìng and shìbì because truth-conditional seman-
tics cannot deal with contextual effects in the se-
mantics of yídìng and shìbì. Following Veltman 
(1996), I propose an information state  is a pair 
<A, s>, where s is a proposition and A is an af-
firmative ordering. Yídìng() performs update on 
an information state: A is update with  and s is 
specified to be a subset of or equal of , as long as 
 is true in one of the absolutely affirmative worlds. 
Otherwise, uttering yídìng() leads to an absurd 
state. This is how a strong epistemic necessity 
reading is derived. 
On the other hand, to yield an intensification 
reading, yídìng() performs a test on an infor-
mation state. Yídìng() gives back the original in-
formation state as long as  is true in all of the 
absolutely affirmative worlds. Otherwise, an ab-
surd state is produced. 
As for shìbì, its semantics is identical to that of 
yídìng, except for the following: the s in an infor-
mation state  for shìbì is underspecified and needs 
to be resolved before a proposition presented by 
shìbì can get an appropriate interpretation. The 
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information needed to resolve the underspecified s 
for shìbì must be inferred from the context. 
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